In 2026, Mali faces rising JNIM attacks, blockades in Bamako. Following Malian President Assimi Goita’s seizure of power in 2021, Mali embarked on a strategic transformation by expelling French and U.N. forces from the country. Although this shift was widely considered risky given the region’s fragile security architecture, the Malian government has sought to reshape the regional security paradigm through new partnerships. In this context, Mali has continued its fight against terrorist organizations by engaging in security-based cooperation with countries such as Russia, China and Türkiye.
Mali is sinking deeper into chaos. In a series of attacks unprecedented in scale launched on Saturday, April 25, jihadists from JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims)[1] and Tuareg rebels from the FLA (Azawad Liberation Front)[2] targeted the positions of the ruling junta in several major cities across the country, now threatening the capital, Bamako. Among the victims of these attacks is Defense Minister Sadio Camara. The death of one of the regime’s key figures underscores the weakening of a military junta that seized power by force in 2020, promising, among other things, to put an end to such violence.
After seizing power following a series of coups (in the summer of 2020 and then in the spring of 2021), the military junta justified its actions by citing the authorities’ inability to defeat the terrorist violence that had plagued the country for many years. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s new strongman, then advocated a program to reclaim lost territories. His strategy involved breaking ties with the state’s traditional allies, including French forces, which had been called in by Bamako in 2013 and were forced to leave the country nearly a decade later. Rejecting Operation Barkhane, the Malian government chose instead to rely, starting in 2022, on Russian mercenaries from Wagner, and later on the Africa Corps, a paramilitary organization directly controlled by Moscow. The military has had some successes to its credit, particularly in 2023, with the recapture of Kidal, a city that had long been held by Tuareg rebels from Azawad (a region encompassing the north of the country). However, setbacks have mounted, from the jihadist blockade of Timbuktu to the fuel crisis caused by the actions of JNIM.
The junta’s weakening is exacerbated by the Africa Corps’ ongoing withdrawal from parts of the north of the country. Like Wagner, which it replaced in 2025, the Russian paramilitary group has never managed to resolve the country’s security issues, despite numerous military operations, particularly when facing groups already well-versed in asymmetric warfare. Long considered a priority sphere of influence for France, the Sahel has, in just a few years, become a key battleground for information warfare. France’s loss of influence, the successive coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the arrival of new foreign actors have profoundly reshaped the region’s media and geopolitical landscape.
The most recent assessments of terrorist violence[3] around the world point to a conclusion that is now hard to ignore: the epicenter of terrorism has shifted to the Sahel and, more broadly, to sub-Saharan Africa. If we consider the overall impact of attacks—and especially the death toll they cause—as the primary criteria, this region now appears to be the main hotbed of terrorist violence on a global scale. This shift represents a major departure from the previous two decades, during which the Middle East and North Africa occupied a central place in strategic assessments of the phenomenon. Global terrorism no longer follows the same patterns as it did at the beginning of the 21st century, and a significant portion of its lethality is now concentrated in the Sahel region. The Sahelian juntas emerged from a genuine popular demand for security and sovereignty, but five years later, the security and humanitarian situation in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has deteriorated dramatically, with a surge in violence, civilian casualties, and population displacement.
Despite the breakdown in relations with Western partners, the rise of the Alliance of Sahelian States, and the replacement of the French presence with Russian cooperation, jihadist groups have grown stronger, exploiting local abuses and the lack of political responses to social divisions. The initial legitimacy of the military regimes is eroding as results fail to materialize, revealing the impasse of a strategy focused exclusively on security that is incapable of rebuilding the social contract and addressing the root causes of instability sustainably. More than five years have passed since August 18, 2020, when Colonel Assimi Goïta overthrew Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Bamako. That initial coup set in motion a cycle that would sweep through Burkina Faso and then Niger, giving rise to the Alliance of Sahel States. A break with Paris, an alignment with Russia, and a dramatic withdrawal from ECOWAS: the geopolitical transformation has been spectacular. But what about concrete results for the people?
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[1] Founded in Mali in 2017, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is now the leading jihadist group in the central Sahel. Since 2019, violence perpetrated by this al-Qaeda affiliate has spread to several countries in the Gulf of Guinea, targeting Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Togo.
[2] The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is a political and military organization in northern Mali founded on November 30, 2024. It was formed following the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Framework—which included the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and parts of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA)—this movement advocates for the independence or autonomy of Azawad.
[3] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2026: « Measuring the impact of terrorism », Sydney, March 2026. Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/resources (accessed Date Month Year).
Read more on July 1st, 2026.